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It was the purpose of this study to assess the sincerity and intentions of 
Senator Huey Long with regard to his Share-Our-Wealth program and to examine 
the feasibility of his plan. 
An examination of Long's background prior to his years in the senate 
was made to determine whether the Share-Our-Wealth plan was a logical exten- 
sion of the influences and activities of his early life.   Long's activities while a 
member of the senate were examined to determine whether he made a reasonable 
effort to enact his plan into working legislation.   To determine the feasibility of 
his plan, the Share-Our-Wealth program was examined from the standpoint of its 
effect upon the economy and its compatibility with American economic freedom. 
It was concluded that Long genuinely believed in his Share-Our-Wealth 
plan, and that he fully intended to implement it by legislation.   It was also con- 
cluded that his program was not entirely unrealistic.   Some elements of it have 
already been applied in essence, and other parts may conceivably be adopted in 
the future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Huey Pierce Long, Jr., was one of the most controversial political 
leaders in the history of the United States.   After a career which included the 
governorship of Louisiana,  Long entered the United States Senate on January 25, 
1932.   He served as senator from Louisiana until his death on September 10, 
1935, a victim of assassination.   As a senator he consistently drew attention to 
the plight of the poor and advocated a program to limit fortunes and thereby 
redistribute wealth.   By the time of Long's death in 1935, this program had 
grown into his Share-Our-Wealth movement, which rivaled the New Deal as a 
plan for economic recovery.   It also made Long a potential rival of Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt for the Presidency. 
Almost every aspect of Long's career has been a subject of controversy. 
He has been denounced as a potential dictator and described as a ". . . twisted 
psychological type . .  . with a power fixation dating from boyhood."     Cer- 
tainly the degree of political power which Long acquired in Louisiana alarmed 
many people, and when they saw his drive for the Presidency mounting, they 
naturally concluded that he posed a real threat to American democracy.   Many 
have also questioned the feasibility of Long's Share-Our-Wealth plan and his 
^ames Rorty,  "Callie Long's Boy Huey, " Forum and Century XCIV 
(August,  1935), p. 127. 
IV 
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sincerity in advocating it.   Carleton Beals described the plan as "a turnip on the 
end of the stick, " a plan which was "either demagogic hypocrisy or else economic 
ignorance."     Even the sympathetic observer, T. Harry Williams, once wrote 
"There is room to doubt that he (LongJ meant ever to translate the formula into 
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working legislation." 
There has been an over-reaction to some aspects of Long's career.   He 
unquestionably held too much power in Louisiana, and understandably he was 
denounced for that.   But he has been treated most unfairly in assessments of his 
sincerity with regard to the Share-Our-Wealth program and its feasibility. 
Professor Williams seems to have arrived at this conclusion in his recent bio- 
graphy of Long.   Williams now holds that Long "probably did believe that the 
SOW was a workable formula, " and since wealth was more difficult to redistri- 
bute than the Senator had thought at first,  "He would probably have modified the 
plans,  if he had become President, retaining and emphasizing the tax provi- 
sions."3   Even these statements seem to betray some doubt as to whether Long 
was fully behind his Share-Our-Wealth program. 
1Carleton Beals, The Story of Huey P. Long (Philadelphia:  J. P. 
Lippincott,   1935), p. 312. 
2In Introduction to Huey P. Long,  Every Man a King (Chicago:   Quad- 
rangle Books, 1964),  p. xxiv. 
^T. Harry Williams, Huey Long (New York:   Alfred A. Knopf,  1970), 
p. 696. 
The lack of a substantial body of Long papers    may always foster doubt 
as to the sincerity and intentions of Louisiana's controversial leader.   A natural 
tendency to label as inferior those programs which were not adopted may also 
predispose many to view Long's proposals as unrealistic.   Nevertheless, Long 
genuinely believed in his Share-Our-Wealth plan, and he fully intended to imple- 
ment it by legislation.   Furthermore, his program was not entirely unrealistic; 
some elements of it have already been applied in essence, and other parts may 
conceivably be adopted in the future. 
What was the content of Long's Share-Our-Wealth program?   From what 
did it develop?  In what ways was it a realistic program?   What evidence indi- 
cates that Long intended to enact it into working legislation?   The purpose of this 
study is to suggest answers to these questions. 
1In personal correspondence with the present writer, T. Harry 
Williams indicated that as of July 2,  1969, no substantial body of Long papers 
existed.   Subsequently, many papers were found at Louisiana State University. 
In a recent article concerning these papers, however,  Dr. Williams revealed 
that "practically nothing" was found which deals with Long's senatorial years, 
and those described have no bearing on the questions considered in this study. 
See T. Harry Williams and John Milton Price,  "The Huey P. Long Papers at 
Louisiana State University, " Journal of Southern History, XXVI (May,  1970), 
pp. 256-261. 
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CHAPrER I 
THE HOSTILITY TO GREAT WEALTH 
Any story of the development of Huey Long's ideas must take account of 
the traditions of Winn Parish, the parish in north central Louisiana where he was 
born.   The Longs were not newcomers to the parish.   Huey's grandparents,  Mary 
and John M. Long, together with their children settled there in the community of 
Tunica in 1859.     His parents moved from Tunica to Winnfield, the parish seat, 
shortly before he was born on August 30,  1893. 
Winn Parish is in the Piney Woods section of Louisiana, an area which 
had never been suited to plantation agriculture.     During the 1800s, this kind of 
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land had sold for fifty cents to six dollars per acre.     As a result, subsistence 
farmers and men of little capital had settled there.   Although the area was poor, 
the people were proud,  individualistic, and not prone to accept their lot without 
complaint.5   Being outside the circle which dominated the eonomic and political 
1 Forrest Davis, Huey Long:   A Candid Biography (New York:   Dodge 
Publishing Company,  1935), pp. 44-45. 
2Huey P. Long, Every Man a King (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), p. 2. 
3Roger Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press,  1939), p. 9. 
4Ibid., p. 10. 
5T. Harry Williams, Huey Long (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), pp. 22-24. 
life of the South, they developed a definite hostility toward those within it. 
The Civil War, the Populist revolt of the 1890's, and the Socialist move- 
ment of the early 1900's, all occasioned dissent and hostility by the citizens of 
Winn.   In the earliest of these the small farmers of Winn did not rally to the 
support of a society based on plantation agriculture.   The parish delegate to the 
Louisiana secession convention was one of only seven who voted against the 
ordinance of secession,    and according to one account, about half of the potential 
soldiers of the parish fled to the woods to escape service in the Confederate 
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Army.     Winn did not withhold its support however, from the Populist move- 
ment.   The parish is credited with being among the first to organize the 
Louisiana Peoples Party in the year 1890.     It subsequently became a strong 
center of Populist activity,  furnishing one of the two Louisiana delegates at the 
party's national convention in 1891, the Peoples Party candiate for governor in 
1892, and the only Populist at the state constitutional convention in 1898.   The 
Peoples Party of Louisiana adopted essentially all of the national program, and 
pushed also for legal reforms designed to lessen the power of the "black 
parishes" and the appointive power of the governor; both of these, they felt, had 
1Roger Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana, pp. 166-167. 
2James Rorty, "Callie Long's Boy Huey, " Forum and Century, XCIV 
(August,  1935), p. 126. 
3MelvinJ. White,  "Populism in Louisiana During the Nineties,"  The 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, V Qune,  1918),  p. 5. 
worked to the detriment of the "white" or hill parishes.1   Daring the 1892 cam- 
paign, the attention of the voters was called to such issues as 
the baneful influence of monopolies,  the hard lot of the common people, 
and the corrupt alliance . . . between those who usurped too great a 
share of the profits of the producers of wealth and professional politi- 
cians . .  . which .  . . had destroyed the usefulness of both the two 
great political parties.■ 
Apparently these issues appealed to the voters of Winn because the Populists won 
every election held in the parish until 1900.     This spirit of social protest, 
according to T. Harry Williams, carried over into a strong support for the 
Socialist Party which,  in 1908, elected half of the parish officials in Winn and 
received thirty-six percent of Winn's popular vote in the presidential election of 
1912.4 
Some of the Longs had opposed the Civil War, but apparently no Long 
became a noticeable participant in either the Populist or the Socialist move- 
ments. ^   Nevertheless, evidence of the local hostility to great wealth can be 
seen in the words of Huey's father, who in 1935 justified Huey's efforts to re- 
distribute the wealth: 
Didn't Abe Lincoln free the niggers and not give the planters a 
dime?   Why shouldn't Huey take the money away from the rich and still 
leave 'em plenty?  Abe Lincoln freed the niggers without price.   Why 
shouldn't the white slaves be freed and their masters left all they can 
use?   Maybe you're surprised to hear talk like that.   Well, it was just 
such talk that my boy was raised under and that I was raised under. 
1lbid., pp. 6-7,  18.      2lbid., p. 12. 
3T. Harry Williams, Huey Long, p. 23. 
'hbid., p. 44.      5Ibid., pp. 23, 44-45. 
My father and my mother favored the Union.   Why not?  They didn't have 
slaves.   They didn't even have decent land.   The rich folks had all the 
good land and all the slaves—why, their women didn't even comb their 
own hair.   They'd sooner speak to a nigger than to a poor white.   They 
tried to pass a law saying that only them as owned land could vote.   And, 
when the War came, the man that owned ten slaves didn't have to fight. 
There wants to be a revolution, I tell you.   I seen this domination of 
capital, seen it for seventy years.   What do these rich folks care about 
the poor man?  They care nothing—not for his pain, his sickness, nor his 
death.1 
Any hostility so deeply rooted as this would undoubtedly be absorbed by 
the young members of a family.   Besides making the youngsters sympathetic to- 
ward the poor,  it would likely make them greatly receptive to economic and 
political issues of an egalitarian cast.   This seems to have been the case with 
Huey Long.   Seemingly genuine sympathy for the poor is expressed in his later 
story of witnessing as a child the spectacle of a farmer publicly pleading with 
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people not to bid on his farm, which was being auctioned off for a debt.     In 
1914,  while a law student at Tulane,  Long became greatly concerned with an 
issue which lay at the heart of the Progressive movement—the concentration of 
wealth in the United States.   By his own account, he was impressed by an 
instructor's demonstration of the way in which the Louisiana inheritance law 
discouraged the concentration of fortunes by requiring that estates be divided 
equally among the heirs.   He subsequently wrote to   Representative John T. 
Watkins of Louisiana suggesting that Watkins introduce in Congress a proposal 
^James Rorty,  "Callie Long's Boy Huey, " p. 78. 
2Huey P. Long, Every Man a King, pp. 3-4. 
to make the Louisiana law uniform throughout the United States. 
In 1918 Huey's friend, State Senator S. J. Harper of Winn Parish, 
called publicly for the financing of World War I through the conscription of war 
profits and swollen fortunes.   Harper argued that two percent of the people owned 
seventy percent of the nation's wealth and that the country faced financial slavery 
unless the war profiteers were made to bear a just share of the costs of the 
2 
war.     When Harper was brought to trial under the Espionage Act for express- 
ing these ideas,  Long, who had by then become a lawyer, took the case and 
successfully defended him in court.   In addition,  Long wrote a letter to the New 
Orleans Item and other papers expressing concern for the growing concentration 
of wealth,  pointing out as Harper had that about two percent of the people owned 
sixty-five or seventy percent of the wealth.   He said that this condition was 
stifling educational opportunity throughout the country.3  While Harper's in- 
fluence on Long's career was probably not great, 4 the case gave Long an 
opportunity to react to the issue of concentrated wealth in a significant way. 
Long also entered politics in 1918.   He ran for a seat on the State 
Railway Commission, and after campaigning on an anticorporation platform, won 
the election.   The Railway Commission later became the Public Service Com- 
mission with expanded power to regulate public utilities in the state.   Long 
Congressional Record,  74th Congress,  1st Session,  LXXIX, p. 9910, 
June 22,  1935. 
2HueyP. Long,  Every Man a King, p. 34.        Ibid., pp. 37-39. 
4See T. Harry Williams, Huey Long, p. 113. 
apparently found his position to be a stimulating one.   Working through the three- 
man commission, he was instrumental in forcing a reduction in telephone rates, 
the Southwestern Gas and Electric Company rates, the rates charged by 
Shreveport's streetcars, and those of intrastate railroads.   In addition, he was 
influential in having the legislature enact a three percent severance tax on 
petroleum drawn from Louisiana oil wells.     He was also successful in getting 
the oil pipelines belonging to the Standard Oil Company declared "common 
carriers, " a move which aided the independent oil men who no longer had to sell 
to Standard at whatever prices they demanded in order to use the pipelines. 
Long's effort in this last case may have been partially inspired by a personal loss 
of money invested in independent oil companies which had virtually been ruined 
by the competition of Standard Oil.   Nevertheless, this effort was perfectly in 
keeping with his by now established views on business and the public interest. 
In various political campaigns,  Long seemed to offer his support to the 
most progressive candidate.   In 1920 he campaigned for John M. Parker, the 
successful Democratic nominee for governor, who had been the Progressive 
Party candidate in 1916.    Long later broke with Parker over the oil pipeline con- 
troversy, however, and ran for governor himself in 1924.   He advocated a road 
construction program, free textbooks for school children, and improved state 
services.   He denounced concentrated wealth and corporate influence on 
government, and he promised to make corporations pay their fair share of 
1Allan Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana:   State Politics,  1920-1952 
(Baltimore:   John Hopkins Press,  1956),  pp. 46-48. 
taxes. 1   Long was defeated on this first try for the office, but was elected when 
o 
he ran again in 1928 on essentially the same platform. 
The new Governor Long was described by one historian as,  "young and 
extremely progressive.'      He immediately began to fulfill his campaign pro- 
mises by obtaining legislation providing for paved roads and free textbooks. 
He later increased the severance tax on such natural resources as oil and timber, 
and otherwise shifted the burden of taxes to the corporations.   These, together 
with bond issues, financed the huge programs without placing additional taxes 
on the common man.    Long heeded his campaign promises so closely that on 
April 16,  1930, he could safely challenge the voters to write down any promise 
which he had not kept and mail it to him.5 
Governor Long was not able to carry out his program without diffi- 
culty, however.   Efforts were made to impeach him in 1929, and his plans to 
complete his road-building program met effective opposition in the legislature 
shortly thereafter.6  The legislature refused to sanction by the necessary 
lT. Harry Williams, Huey Long, pp.  199, 206. 
2Ibid., pp. 262-263. 
3Garnie McGinty, A History of Louisiana (New York:   The Exposition 
Press,  1949), p. 255. 
*T. Harry Williams, Huey Long, pp. 280-311. 
5George N. French,  "School Children Strew His Path With Rosebuds, " 
The Louisiana Progress, April 17, 1930, p. 1,  1. 
6New York Times, July 17,  1930, p. 2, 2. 
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two-thirds vote a constitutional amendment which would permit Long's proposal 
for financing the roads, a bond issue, to be decided by popular vote.   In an 
attempt to arouse public opinion and force the legislature to submit, Long estab- 
lished a newspaper, The Louisiana Progress, conducted a speaking tour of the 
state, and finally ran for the United States Senate. 
The first issue of the Louisiana Progress was published on March 27, 
1930.   It purported to tell "the full truth about Louisiana affairs, " but it was, of 
course, openly in favor of all of Governor Long's political programs.     Its 
coverage of Long's tour of the state revealed that,  in addition to the road issue, 
the governor consistently touched upon the evils of chain stores.   While his pur- 
pose in doing this was to create support for proposals to tax the stores, the 
issue was largely unrelated to his main objective and appears to be mainly an 
expression of his continuing anticorporation sentiment.   The first issue of the 
paper quoted Long's charge that the stores were guilty of short-weighing.   He 
accused them of subservience to the "bloody barons of Wall Street, " and of 
enslaving in turn the people of Louisiana.    Long praised W. F. Henderson, the 
owner of a Shreveport radio station,  for his campaign against the stores.   In 
words curiously like those of his father in 1935,  Long declared that Henderson 
was "doing this nation as good a piece of emancipation as Abe Lincoln did when 
he freed the slaves."2   In subsequent speeches the governor urged independent 
^The Louisiana Progress, March 27,  1930, p. 1,  4-5. 
2Ibid., p. 1,  8. 
grocers to set lower prices in order to undersell the "chain robbers" and to put 
pressure on their senators and representatives for political relief.1   He argued 
that the chain stores did nothing to help the community, and that they dispatched 
profits overnight to Wall Street, and drove the independent merchant out of 
business.2 
On May 1, the Louisiana Progress declared that the chain store problem 
had become acute and that it required "more consideration on the part of the 
public than any others of an economic nature that has (sicj come up in the past 
decade. "*   However, another editorial on June 19went beyond the chain store 
issue and indicted big business in general.   It referred to a speech of Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt alleging that fifty or sixty big companies, each controlled by 
two or three men,  did about eighty percent of the industrial business of the 
country.   The editorial pointed out the folly of permitting this concentration of 
economic power, adding that "the depression is proof that as rulers of economic 
destiny, our billionaires are not always wise." 
In his tour of the state, Governor Long did not lose sight of the big 
issue--that of the roads. It seemed that he was making little headway in his 
efforts to win the legislature, however, and on April 16,  1930, he indicated 
1Ibid., May 1, 1930, p. 1,  3. 
2George N. French,  "School Children Strew His Path With Rosebuds, " 
The Louisiana Progress, April 17,  1930, p.  1,  1. 
3The Louisiana Progress, May 1,  1930, p. 4,  1-2. 
4Ibid., June 19,  1930, p. 4,   1-2. 
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strongly that he would run for the senate, submitting both his road program and 
himself to the people for their approval. 
By June, despite a hard fought campaign to force the legislature to sub- 
mit the bond issue to the voters, it was obvious that Long could not get the 
necessary two-thirds vote.   In a statement to the people he admitted his defeat 
but indicated that he could accomplish the same results by having the legislature 
call a constitutional convention for the road question only—a move which would 
require only a majority of the legislators.   He then urged the people to write 
9 
their state senators and representatives and ask support for such a move.     The 
edition of the Louisiana Progress which carried this statement also featured a 
cartoon picturing Louisiana's Senator Joseph E. Ransdall, a Long opponent, as 
wondering how long he would stay in the United States Senate.   If this was a 
threat to those who opposed the governor's road program, it seemed to have 
little effect.   A few members of the state senate were able by filibustering to 
prevent a vote on Long's call for a constitutional convention.   Long then an- 
nounced,  on July 16, his candidacy for the United States Senate.   In announcing 
his candidacy, he stressed the significance of the road issue: 
p. 1,  1. 
XGeorge N. French,  "School Children Strew His Path With Rosebuds, " 
^he Louisiana Progress, June 26,  1930,  p. 1,  7-8. 
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In effect my election will mean that the Legislature will submit 
my plan to the people, or those who refuse to accede to the publicly 
expressed stand of the voters will be signing their own political 
death warrant in the approaching election. * 
The chain store issue was also ventilated during the campaign.   On August 14 
Long's paper accused the chain store kings of opposing him out of fear that as 
a United States Senator he would begin to curb their unethical practices. *   Later, 
taking note of suggestions that he ought to base his campaign more on national 
issues,  Long enumerated the four main subjects before Congress as labor, 
farm relief,  foreign affairs, and flood control.   But unable to suppress his 
suspicion of wealth, he saw the evil influence of big business behind United 
States military interventions in Latin America.   He criticized Senator Ransdall's 
position on all of these issues and expressed his intention to more truly repre- 
sent the wishes of the people.   At the same time Long made it unmistakably 
clear that he would serve out his term as governor, leaving the senate seat 
vacant for awhile. 
The primary election was held on September 9,  1930.   Long was 
triumphant, carrying fifty-one of sixty-four parishes.   He had accurately 
gauged the significance of the election to the road issue, because he was able to 
obtain the legislature's approval of his road program before the month was out. 
1Ibid., July 17, 1930, p. 1, 1-2. 
2Ibid., August 14,  1930, p. 1, 2. 
3Ibid., August 28,  1930, p. 19,  1-5. 
*Ibid.t September 25,  1930, p. 1,  7-8. 
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Long's victory in the primary assured his election in November.     Although he 
did not need a campaign issue, the passage of his road program left a void 
which he could fill with any issue he wished to advocate.   He returned to the 
question which had previously been of central concern—the concentration of 
wealth. 
In October, Long declared that the greatest obstacle to American 
prosperity was the unjust way in which wealth had become distributed.   He used 
Harper's figures again to charge that "seventy percent of the wealth is in the 
hands of less than two percent of the people."     He looked forward, he said, to 
going to the senate and there solving "the economic problem that is nationwide 
and worldwide. "J 
After the November election the Louisiana Progress was published on a 
monthly basis, and in December Long contributed the first of a series of 
articles which blamed the depression on the concentration of wealth.   He even 
tried to show that the Bible condemned it.   In an article in June 1931,  Long 
referred to a Saturday Evening Post article of 1916, entitled "Are We Rich or 
Poor, " which alleged that the United States was "a bloated plutocracy com- 
prising less than one percent lording it over a starveling horde with only a thin 
margin of merely well-to-do in between. "4   He also quoted from the report of 
*Long was, in fact,  unopposed in the November election. 
2The Louisiana Progress, October 23,  1930, p.  1,  2. 
3Ibid.       4Ibid., June 1931, p. 1, 2-4. 
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the 1916 Industrial Relations Commission which indicated that two percent of the 
people owned sixty-five percent of the wealth.   Long asked,  "What does a man 
need with a hundred million dollars . .  . ?"  The country had plenty of every- 
thing, he said,  but the people could not purchase what they needed because so 
much was possessed by so few.   "If the wealth . .  . were reasonably distributed 
into the hands of a large number of people, then there would be consumption to 
keep up with the production.'" 
In none of Long's articles had he proposed any specific remedy.   In 
August,  1931, he advised people to barter with their neighbors for needed items. 
He cautioned them to keep a good garden and reminded them of the nutritional 
value of pot likker.   He asked them to be liberal with their neighbors and not to 
forget the Negroes. 
By the time Long was elected to the senate, two factors had emerged 
which would have a bearing upon any assessment of his future career.    First, he 
had acquired an inherent hostility to wealth and an economic philosophy which 
seemed to revolve around the belief that wealth was becoming increasingly con- 
centrated in the hands of a few.   This would help explain his view of the cause of 
the depression and his future program for economic recovery.   Second,  Long had 
established a good record for fulfilling campaign promises while governor of 
Louisiana.   This would seem to justify a measure of confidence in any future 
pledges which he might make as a national political leader. 
Ibid.      2Ibid.,  August,  1931, p. 1,  2-3. l,u: 
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CHAPTER II 
THE ATTACK UPON CONCENTRATED WEALTH 
Huey Long took office as United States Senator on January 25,  1932. 
The depression was deepening, and many people were searching for solutions to 
the economic calamity which had hit the country.   The Louisiana Progress sus- 
pended publication after the January 1932 issue, but it had revealed through its 
articles and coverage of Long's activities that the new senator would take some 
kind of action against concentrated wealth and perhaps would make some pro- 
posal for its redistribution.   This seemed even more likely on March 4 when 
Long predicted in an interview that the great political fight in the country would 
come over the inheritance tax, that being the only way to reduce the concentration 
of wealth.1   On March 18 he repeated on the senate floor his view that the 
economic condition of the country was caused by a handful of men owning all the 
wealth.   With an eye to the 1932 revenue bill then under consideration in the 
House, he told senators that the concentration of wealth and such possible 
remedies as steeper inheritance and income taxes would soon come before the 
senate.   He wanted these issues decided from the standpoint of the common 
2 
man's interest,  not that of the vested interests. 
*New York Times, March 4,  1932, p. 21,  5. 
Congressional Record, 72nd Congress,  1st Session,  LXXXV,  p. 6452. 
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On March 21 Long returned to the matter of concentrated wealth in his 
longest senate speech to date.   He quoted statistics to show that wealth had be- 
come twice as concentrated since 1916.   This, he said, had changed the country 
into a commercial chain enterprise which was driving independent businesses 
out of existence at the rate of 435 per day since 1927.   He called for balancing 
the budget through high inheritance taxes, high tax rates on the larger incomes, 
and taxes upon such trusts as Standard Oil.     This speech seemed to have been 
advertised in advance.   The galleries were filled, and about seventy-five 
members of the house of representatives had come to listen.      That Long had 
spoken to an appreciative audience was evident from the "prolonged applause" 
3 
which he received from the gallery at the end of his speech. 
Obviously encouraged by the reception of these remarks,  Long inten- 
sified his attack on concentrated wealth and presented further evidence for his 
case.   In an address on April 4 he charged that a determined effort was being 
made to prevent the 1932 tax bill 
from going into the field of surtaxes and inheritance taxes,    that would 
give the common man of the country a chance, and give the wealth of 
this country an opportunity to be distributed among the people of the 
United States.4 
1Ibid., pp. 6541-6544. 
2New York Times,  March 22,  1932, p. 2,  2. 
3Ibid. 
p. 7372. 
Congressional Record, 72nd Congress,  1st Session,  LXXV, 
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He charged that such men as Rockefeller,  Morgan, and Baruch were behind 
these efforts.   As further proof of the concentration of wealth,  Long presented 
statistics which showed that in 1929,  540 "supermillionaires" had an aggregate 
net income large enough to purchase the entire wheat and cotton crops of 1930, 
and that the largest income tax payers earned enough to pay the wages of the 
workers in the entire clothing industry with 100 million dollars left over.   He 
warned that there must be relief from such an anomaly, or 1932 would, in 
retrospect, look like a prosperous year. 
As yet,  Long had not proposed any specific bill to correct the con- 
centration of wealth, but had been content with presenting his case in general 
terms.   On April 21, while the tax bill was before the Senate Finance Committee, 
he introduced a resolution which asked the senate to instruct the Finance Com - 
mittee to amend the revenue bill 
so that no person shall have an annual income in excess of 
$1, 000, 000, and so that no person during his or her lifetime shall 
receive gifts, inheritances,  or other bequests more than 
$5,000,000.^ 
With this resolution Long made a specific proposal to help prevent the further 
concentration of wealth, but it contained no method for immediate redistribution. 
Long presumably felt that government spending of the additional revenue on 
social welfare programs would partially effect that. 
The idea of a limit on incomes was not entirely new to the senate.   On 
January 25,  1932,  Long's first day there, three measures were presented with a 
XIbid.,  pp.   7372-7377.      2Ibid., p. 8556. 
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purpose of placing some limitation upon the maximum salary which could be 
paid by any business enterprise receiving a loan from the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation.   An additional proposal was designed to prevent such an 
enterprise from reducing the pay of employees whose salaries were less than 
$2, 000 per year.   Although all were defeated, the record shows that Long voted 
for those on which a roll-call vote was taken. 
On April 29 the senate, by voice vote, refused to consider Long's 
resolution to limit incomes and bequests. According to Long himself, he 
received the support of only half a dozen senators. ^ 
When the revenue bill came before the senate in May,  Long made no 
further effort to push his resolution.   He took a vigorous part in the debate, 
however, urging especially the increased taxation of higher incomes. 
The existing law imposed a maximum surtax rate of twenty percent on 
amounts over $1, 000, 000.4  The bill passed by the house proposed to increase 
this maximum to forty percent, and the Senate Finance Committee reported the 
bill with further increases, proposing to take forty-five percent of amounts over 
$100, 000.5   When the bill reached the floor Senator Couzens of Michigan 
1Ibid., pp. 2632-2645.      2Ibid., p. 9202. 
3Letter from Huey Pierce Long to Certain Constituents, June 22, 
1933.   Huey Pierce Long Papers,  Duke University, Durham, North Carolina; 
Huey P. Long,  Every Man a King, p. 30. 
New York Times, June 3,  1932,  p. 1,  8. 
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submitted an amendment increasing the surtax rates still further to a maximum 
of sixty-five percent on incomes in excess of $1, 000, 000.     Long supported this 
proposal, although he also supported an amendment of Senator Trammell of 
Florida to reduce the Couzens rates on the first $4, 000 of income, leaving the 
2 
higher rates unchanged.     The latter amendment received only four votes, and 
the Couzens proposal was defeated 49 to 31. 
Senator Connally of Texas then offered an amendment fixing all income 
tax rates at levels slightly below those of the Couzens amendment and leaving 
4 
the maximum surtax rate at fifty-five percent of the excess of $1, 000, 000. 
This was still above the committee recommendation.    Long was determined to 
get this much, and when it appeared that the Connally amendment too was 
headed for defeat, he began a filibuster which forced a delay on the vote until 
the following day.   During the filibuster he declared mat neither the Couzens nor 
Connally amendments would really bring an end to bloated fortunes.   But that 
goal, he said, must be approached through the tax system.   He also expressed 
opposition to certain other features of the committee's bill which placed taxes 
on movies, automobiles, radios,  matches, candy, and other "luxuries."   Long 
regarded it as "almost a crime" to institute such taxes in order to avoid taxing a 
man making $1, 000, 000 clear or even $5, 000 clear.   He denied that it was a 
luxury for "a poor man to go to a show, listen to a radio, or ride in a Ford 
1Ibid., pp. 10108-10109.      2Ibid., p. 10273. 
3Ibid., pp. 10275-10276.      4Ibid., pp. 10277-10278. 
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car."     Despite Long's efforts, however, the Connally amendment was defeated 
46 to 31.2 
Objection to both the Couzens and Connally amendments had been 
voiced partially on the ground that the proposed rates raised taxes too much on 
lower incomes.   This objection had been a factor in motivating the Trammell 
amendment, yet according to Long, it was defeated with the help of some 
senators who had proposed this argument.    Long pointed out this inconsistency 
and denied that the increased rates on such incomes as $5, 000 were a valid rea- 
son for opposing the Couzens or Connally amendments.   He asserted that ninety- 
five percent of the people would be glad to place themselves in the $5, 000 
income group despite the increases.   In a final effort,  Long submitted an 
amendment which accepted the relatively low rates proposed by the Finance 
Committee on incomes below $10, 000, but adopted the Couzens rates from there 
up.3   Long again attacked concentrated wealth and quoted passages from 
William Jennings Bryan, Theodore Roosevelt, Herbert Hoover,  Lord Bacon, and 
the Bible in support of his position.   His amendment was defeated, however, by a 
vote of 49 to 24.4 
Due to a visit to Louisiana,  Long missed a reconsideration of the 
Connally amendment which passed the senate on May 31.   He was paired in 
favor of the measure, however.   Long's efforts to decentralize the wealth 
1Ibid., pp. 10200-10301.      2Ibid., p. 10389. 
3Ibid., p.  10391.      4Ibid., p.  10400. 
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through what he would have considered a satisfactory restructuring of the tax 
system had failed.   Only a tiny minority of senators were prepared to go as far 
he in this direction. 
Throughout May,  Long continued his attack upon concentrated wealth by 
injecting the subject into whatever discussion was being held on the floor of the 
senate.   Among those whom he quoted to support his stand was Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt: 
We may build factories, but the fact remains that we have enough now to 
supply all our domestic needs and more,  if they are used.   No, our 
basic trouble was an insufficiency of capital,  it was an insufficient dis- 
tribution of buying power coupled with an oversufficient speculation in 
production. ■ 
Thus Long ascribed to Roosevelt the view that the concentration of wealth had 
caused the depression by depriving people of money with which to buy. 
By June 1932,  Long had attracted national attention through the relent- 
less pursuit of his economic proposals.   He was asked to become the presi- 
o 
dential candidate on the Farmer-Labor ticket but refused the offer.     Instead, he 
arrived in Chicago on June 21 to lead the Louisiana delegation for Roosevelt at 
the Democratic National Convention.3   He worked hard for Roosevelt and,  by 
influencing the Mississippi delegation to hold firm at one point, helped prevent a 
break in the Roosevelt forces which could have cost the New York governor the 
1Ibid., p. 10873. 
2New York Times, June 18,  1932, p. 1,  2. 
3New York Times, June 22,  1932, p. 8,  6. 
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nomination. 
After the adjournment of Congress on July 16,  1932, Long campaigned 
in Arkansas and Louisiana on behalf of senatorial candidates who professed 
support for his program.   He first invaded Arkansas on behalf of Senator Hattie 
Caraway,  who was running for re-election in the August 9 primary against re- 
portedly strong opposition. 
Long's campaign on behalf of Mrs. Caraway was motivated by a variety 
of factors--a growing feud with Senator Robinson, her Arkansas colleague and a 
factional rival, the desire to keep Mrs. Caraway, a Long supporter,  in the 
senate, and the fact that the situation presented Long an opportunity to demon- 
strate his national appeal.   The feud with Senator Robinson arose from the 
latter's refusal to support Long's resolution to limit incomes and inheritances. 
The same day that Robinson had helped defeat the resolution,  Long retaliated 
with a vicious speech insinuating that Robinson and other party leaders were 
under the influence of Wall Street bankers.    Long had declared on that occasion 
that he would vote a Farmer-Labor ticket or even Republican in November if 
either of those parties advocated a reduction of swollen fortunes in preference to 
a Democratic ticket advocating the ideas of Robinson and Bernard Baruch.   At 
the same time,  in a spectacular display of political independence,  Long resigned 
from all senate committees to which he had been assigned by Robinson.   He 
indicated that, while he did not want a test of strength with Robinson over the 
1 William E. Leuchtenburg,  Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 
1932-1940 (New York:   Harper and Row, Publishers,  1963), p. 7. 
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matter of senate leadership, he might be led to go before the people themselves 
for a test of strength on the question of the concentration of wealth; this, he said, 
might occur in Louisiana, in Arkansas, or elsewhere. 
Long's intention of testing the strength of his program in Senator 
Robinson's home state was indicated in July 1932, just prior to the adjournment 
of Congress.   On the senate floor Long read a statement by Mrs. Caraway ex- 
plaining that it was necessary for her to be home campaigning.   Long praised 
her voting record in the senate, especially her stand relative to swollen fortunes, 
and called upon senators to join him in support of her re-election.2  The follow- 
ing month, Long began a speaking campaign in Arkansas on her behalf.   His 
tour opened on the theme of redistributing wealth, and Long assured the people 
that they could depend upon Mrs. Caraway to vote for the rights of the common 
man.3   Mrs. Caraway won a landslide victory, 4 and many observers attributed 
her success to Long's efforts on her behalf.5 
After the campaign in Arkansas, Long returned to Louisiana and cam- 
paigned for John H. Overton,  one of his lieutenants, who was running against 
Senator Edwin Broussard,  Long's colleague, who was not part of the Long group. 
Congressional Record, 72nd Congress,  1st Session,  LXXV, 
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2Ibid.,  pp. 15191-15192. 
3New York Times, August 2,  1932, p. 6, 6. 
4Ibid., August 11,  1932, p. 4, 6. 
5T. Harry Williams, Huey Long, p. 592. 
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He dwelt on the same issue as before, stressing "his plan to outlaw incomes 
over a million a year. "     Overton too was nominated and elected. 
The lame-duck session of the 72nd Congress opened on December 5, 
1932.   Despite the political strength which Long had demonstrated in the recent 
elections,  he made no serious effort in that session to secure passage of his 
program to limit incomes and inheritances.   He did try, however, to popularize 
the program with an eye to future legislation.   On the second day of the session, 
he declared that the most noticed issue of the recent campaigns was that of 
concentrated wealth.   He asserted that Roosevelt had been nominated and 
elected "on the one great fundamental, necessary principle of the decentraliza- 
tion of wealth in America."2  This being so, he questioned whether the congres- 
sional leadership was in tune with the wishes of the people on that question.   He 
then advocated a program of higher income and inheritance taxes,  the regulation 
of working hours to prevent overproduction, government control of surplus 
crops, together with a balancing of farm production with consumption, and 
enough money in circulation to carry on the business of the country and create a 
rise in commodity prices.   He asserted that conditions had grown worse and that 
wealth had concentrated until the top structure had nothing below upon which it 
could rest.   Therefore, he deemed it necessary to organize for action, 
1New York Times,  September 11, 1932, p. 6,  1. 
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decentralize the wealth of the nation and diffuse it among the people.     Long 
also, on December 7, attended the Democratic caucus, and according to Senator 
Robinson of Arkansas, urged it to endorse his proposals, arguing that the party 
platform already supported them. 
In January 1933,  Long revealed what would become perhaps the most 
controversial ingredient of his economic program--the capital tax levy.   He 
suggested during a filibuster against the Glass banking bill that he would solve 
the farmers' economic problems by raising a ten billion dollar fund for public 
works and employment until a balance of farm production and consumption 
would permit their resumption of farming.   The fund was to be raised from 
taxes on huge incomes and inheritances, and if necessary by a small capital 
levy--a graduated tax on the amount of wealth a person owned.     This capital 
levy tax was a new addition to Long's program, which heretofore had dealt only 
with incomes and inheritances. 
On March 4,  1933,  Franklin Delano Roosevelt became the new chief 
executive, and after a short special session of the senate, the first session of 
the Seventy-Third Congress opened on March 9,  1933.   On the first day, amid 
efforts of the administration to deal with the national bank crisis,  Long proposed 
a constitutional amendment to permit the taxation of capital without 
XIbid., pp. 56-58. 
2New York Times, December 9,  1932, p. 3, 6. 
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apportionment among the states, in the same manner as the income tax.     This 
little-publicized proposal was intended to assure in advance the constitu- 
tionality of Long's capital levy proposal if it were enacted. 
The next day,  Long introduced two bills which he had prepared (and 
which Representative Montet of Louisiana introduced in the house of representa- 
tives simultaneously).   The first proposed a capital tax for the purpose of pro- 
moting the common welfare and providing for the national defense.   It would 
impose this tax annually upon the net capital of individuals according to a 
graduated scale, beginning with fortunes of $1, 000, 000.   It amounted to one 
percent of net capital between $1, 000, 000 and $2, 000, 000, then continued upward 
until net capital of $1000, 000, 000 would be taxed $45, 450, 000, and all over 
$100, 000, 000 would be taken completely by the government.   Net capital was 
defined as the total value of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, 
owned by an individual at the end of the year, less any outstanding indebtedness. 
In addition to the capital tax, the bill proposed to increase gift taxes to a maxi- 
2 
mum of one hundred percent of net gifts in excess of $100, 000, 000. 
Long's second bill was essentially a restatement of the old resolution to 
limit incomes and inheritances.   It proposed an income tax schedule which 
increased rates sharply on the higher incomes to a maximum of one hundred 
percent on aU income over $1,000, 000.   The bill would also increase estate 
Congressional Record, 73rd Congress,  1st Session,  LXXVH, p. 49. 
2Ibid., pp. 124-125. 
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taxes to a maximum of ninety-five percent of estates over $35, 000, 000.   In 
addition,  individual beneficiaries would have to pay a tax of one hundred percent 
on inheritances over $5, 000, 000. 
With these bills Long provided a specific program to limit the concen- 
tration of wealth.   His capital tax would,  in the first year, abolish all fortunes 
of over $100, 000, 000 and reduce them further as the taxes were imposed in 
succeeding years.   He now carried this program to the people. 
On March 17, Long delivered a nation-wide radio address entitled 
"How America Can be Adjusted."   He explained in simple terms that his bills 
would give the government all the money it needed without resort to additional 
taxes, and would prevent all the wealth from being concentrated in the hands of a 
few.   He asserted that the true philosophy of government should be to do the 
greatest good for the greatest number.   But 
We are not doing the greatest good to the greatest number when we let 
the few dominate us in government,  finance, and industry and allow the 
great masses of the people to become the political serfs and industrial 
slaves of superlords of finance. 
Long quoted from his stock of statistics and statements of prominent individuals 
to support his stand against concentrated wealth.   He also noted President 
Roosevelt's declaration that American economic life was dominated by some six 
hundred corporations, and that if concentration continued, at the end of another 
century America would be controlled by perhaps a dozen corporations run by 
only one hundred men.  He said that Roosevelt had declared for redistribution of 
1Ibid.      2Ibid., pp. 786-787. 
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wealth, and that Americans must support him. Long ended, however, by asking 
support for his own bills before Congress. 
In May,  1933, no action having been taken on these measures,  Long 
offered them as an amendment to a pending gasoline tax bill.   He prepared for a 
patient and thorough presentation of his case.   Large charts were hung on the 
senate walls, designed to show year by year the growing concentration of 
wealth in the United States since 1907.   In his speech Long claimed that this 
concentration had made the crash of 1929 inevitable.   He explained his amend- 
ment, adding that his limits on incomes, inheritances, and fortunes were 
probably too high, but he wanted them high enough to avoid crippling individual 
initiative. 
Although Long's proposals would clearly have limited private fortunes, 
the ensuing debate demonstrated that he had no corresponding plan worked out to 
redistribute this wealth to the needy.   He had ideas, however.   In general terms 
he advocated the diffusion of this revenue by Congress "for roads, for schools, 
for farm relief,  for hospitals, for rivers and harbors, for soldiers and sailors, 
for pensions,  for every kind of activity."   He felt that within fifteen years, about 
one-third of the nation's wealth would come back to the treasure for redistribu- 
tion.   Long used the word "drastic" with reference to his capital levy tax, but 
said that it was constitutional and was necessary because other measures to 
prevent the concentration of wealth had not been imposed in time.   Further, he 
lfK. Ibid., pp. 787-789. 
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asserted that the amendments were no more than what he had advocated in the 
presidential campaign "at the request of and with the knowledge and upon the 
advice and consent of the great man who now occupies the position of Chief 
Executive."     Long had indeed advocated these things while campaigning for the 
Democrats in 1932, and Roosevelt had, as Long previously pointed out, made 
public statements which indicated some opposition to concentrated economic 
power.   It is likely also that, at the first meeting between Roosevelt and Long, 
2 
Roosevelt had endorsed in general terms the principle of decentralizing wealth. 
Nevertheless,  Long's claim was an extremely liberal interpretation of the 
president's position, designed mainly to invoke the prestige of the president in 
support of his bill. 
In debate on Long's proposal, Senator Nye of North Dakota suggested 
that Long might enlist greater support by eliminating the capital tax provision. 
Long accepted this suggestion, withdrew the capital tax feature, and left the 
3 
amendment to apply only to incomes and inheritances. 
Despite this maneuver,  Long's amendment was defeated by a vote of 50 
to 14.   Among his supporters--voting, paired,  or announced--were Senators 
Norris of Nebraska,  Wheeler of Montana,  LaFollette of Wisconsin,  Frazier of 
1Ibid., pp. 3319-3324. 
2T. Harry Williams, Huey Long, p. 602. 
Concessional Record,  73rd Congress,  1st Session,  LXXVII, p. 3328. 
29 
North Dakota, and Mrs. Caraway of Arkansas. 
Despite his tactical maneuver on this occasion,  Long did not drop his 
capital levy idea.   In an interview in New York on May 14, Long reiterated his 
belief in its necessity.   He also criticized President Roosevelt for failing to 
carry out campaign promises in its behalf. 
By the time Congress adjourned on June 16,  1933, a growing split was 
evident between Long and the president.   The rift was caused partly by genuine 
differences of philosophy.   Long's belief,  for example, that concentration of 
wealth had caused the depression by depriving the masses of purchasing power 
logically prevented his supporting the administration's "Economy Bill" of 
March 1933, a measure designed to help balance the budget by reducing the 
compensation of veterans and the salaries of government employees.   While 
Long argued against the bill merely by claiming that his own capital levy tax 
and other plans for raising money would balance the budget without reaching 
down into the pockets of the masses,    he obviously felt that the measure would 
make conditions worse by reducing purchasing power even below present levels. 
He therefore voted against the bill at a time when few senators dared vote 
1Ibid., pp. 3328-3329. 
2New York Times, May p5,  1933, p. 2,  1. 
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against economy in government.1   Long's position on the National Industrial 
Recovery Act of June 1933, also shows this basic difference in philosophy. 
While approving that part of the biD which provided for public works,  Long 
criticized the section which permitted industries to draw up codes of fair com- 
petition subject only to the approval of the president.   He complained that the 
antitrust law would be effectively nullified,  since anything prescribed by these 
codes was exempted from antitrust prosecution.   Long claimed that the purpose 
of the antitrust laws had been to prevent the concentration of wealth, but that it 
had already been made ineffective by Supreme Court rulings and by the fact that 
those whom the law was supposed to regulate were entrusted with its enforce- 
ment.   He particularly objected to the rulings of the Supreme Court which 
changed the antitrust law from its original position of prohibiting any restraint 
of trade to one which prohibited only "unreasonable" restraint of trade.   Long 
recalled that he had,  more than a year before, offered a bill to make every 
restraint of trade illegal.   He now predicted dire consequences for the common 
man if the country were placed under a system of business codes drawn up by 
businessmen.2  When the vote on the National Industrial Recovery bill was 
taken,  Long at first voted against it, but upon completion of the roll-call, he 
reversed his position and voted for the bill.3  He explained later, with reference 
to both the codes and the public works sections of the bill, that he had oeen torn 
p. 417. 
1Long was one of thirteen who voted against the Economy Bill.   Ibid., 
2Ibid., pp. 5174-5182.      3Ibid., PP- 5424-5425. 
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"between voting for a bill that undid fundamental principles of democracy on the 
one hand and a promise of a job to the man unemployed on the other." 
While President Roosevelt's policies so far had prevailed over his own, 
Long was winning increased support in the senate for his plan to limit incomes 
and inheritances.    Further, his campaigns in Arkansas and Louisiana had de- 
monstrated the popular appeal of his program.   These factors must have given 
him some hope that his proposals would ultimately be enacted.   Further, they 
undoubtedly whetted his appetite for the presidency.   While his desire for the 
office was not widely acknowledged at this time, it had existed from a much 
earlier date.   Before entering politics he had revealed to his wife his ambition to 
be president and had listed the offices he would hold as steps toward fulfilling 
his ambition.2   Now, with an appealing program,  Long may have begun to feel 
that,  if the depression continued, the presidency would be within his grasp, 
perhaps as early as 1936.   He obviously had every reason to pursue his program 
relentlessly, and he continued to do so. 
Back home during the interval between the first and second sessions of 
the 73rd Congress,  Long revived his newspaper under the new name The 
American Progress.   He also wrote and secured publication of his autobiography, 
and toured Louisiana on behalf of a new tax program for the state. 
The first issue of the American Progress appeared on August 24,  1933. 
1Ibid.,  p. 5602. 
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The paper was an obvious attempt to spread Long's ideas and generate support 
for his program.   In the first of what were to be weekly articles submitted by 
the senator himself,  Long stated that legislation passed to correct such things as 
unemployment and farm relief, or even to inflate the currency,  would do no 
great good unless a limit was placed upon the size of individual fortunes in the 
United States and provision was made for redistributing the wealth and fruits of 
the land among all the people.   He explained his proposals to limit fortunes, 
incomes, and inheritances: 
The whole cast of the program is that above a certain amount, the 
government takes the balance and distributes it to the rank and file of 
humanity through its guarantees, compensations, benefits,  public works, 
etc., thereby keeping a balanced condition so that when the land has 
enough food, all are fed, and so that when the land has sufficient clothes, 
none are naked. 
An editorial in this first issue, entitled "Our Policies, " blamed the present 
trouble on the concentration of wealth and announced,  "Our fight will be directed 
against the establishment of an economic slavery for the masses of our people. "2 
The paper also mildly attacked President Roosevelt.   A front page cartoon de- 
picted the president as attempting to redistribute a small pile of wealth while 
leaving the larger pile—that owned by a small percent of the people—untouched. 
Long's autobiography, Every Man a King, was published in early 
October,   1933.   The American Progress reported that he had spent the greater 
part of the last four months preparing the book.   The paper described the 
1The American Progress, August 24,  1933, p. 1,  4-5. 
2Ibid.,  p. 3,  1-2. 
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volume as Senator Long's story from his boyhood days in Winn, through his 
election to the United States Senate and his campaign there to make America a 
prosperous land in which every man will be a king.   It hailed the book as an 
account of the "hard, relentless battle of one lone man" against the evils of 
corporate interests.     The book is indeed a well written account of Long's 
activities, and it bubbles over with the enthusiasm of a man who is going 
places.   It is also an appeal to limit fortunes and redistribute wealth,  specifi- 
cally advocating the proposals for a capital levy tax and a limit on income and 
inheritances. ^ 
In October Long toured Louisiana advocating his program for a redis- 
tribution of wealth at the national level and a state program of tax relief for the 
people of Louisiana.   The most prominent feature of his tax scheme was a 
provision for the eventual exemption of homesteads of $2, 000 or less from all 
property taxes.3   Long placed his Louisiana program within the context of the 
national scene by declaring that unless his plan for decentralization of wealth 
was adopted, there was little hope for a national recovery.   "If I knew that the 
redistribution of wealth was going to start tomorrow, I would not be advocating a 
! 
tax relief program for Louisiana .-4 
1Ibid., October 19, 1933, p. 1, 6. 
2Huey P. Long, Every Man a King, p. 339. 
3New York Times, November 10,  1933, p. 4, 3. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE PLAN TO SHARE THE WEALTH 
The Second Session of the 73rd Congress opened on January 3,  1934. 
In the American Progress Long announced that the concentration of wealth was 
still the greatest issue before Congress, * and he lost no time in raising it again 
in the senate.   During this session he formulated his Share-Our-Wealth plan, a 
more comprehensive economic program which combined his basic scheme to 
limit incomes,  inheritances, and fortunes with more refined and definite pro- 
posals to guarantee a redistribution of wealth. 
On January 4, Long introduced a joint resolution to provide old-age 
pensions at the rate of thirty dollars per month to all persons over sixty years of 
age who had incomes of less than $1, 000 per year or who possessed property less 
than $10, 000 in value.     He also submitted a resolution to instruct the senate 
Finance Committee to reform all new revenue bills so that personal incomes 
would be limited to $1, 000, 000 per year, inheritances to a lifetime maximum of 
$5, 000, 000, and personal fortunes to $50, 000, 000; this last represented a con- 
siderable reduction of the limit which he had previously proposed.   All amounts 
p. 58. 
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in excess of these figures were to be forfeit to the government.     In a speech on 
January 8,  Long criticized the Roosevelt administration's efforts to cure the 
depression, claiming that the debt incurred by its recovery programs could not 
be discharged by future generations within the present tax structure without 
making conditions worse.   He predicted that his own program would bring in 
fifteen billion dollars per year, enough to let the government do whatever was 
needed.* 
Consideration of his resolutions was delayed by Long's involvement in 
Louisiana politics and his consequent absence from the senate between January 10 
and January 30.   The New Orleans municipal election was held on January 23, 
and Long had organized a slate of candidates to run against the incumbent 
Mayor Semmes Walmsley and other anti-Long men who controlled New Orleans. 
Long campaigned hard during January but failed to carry the election for his 
candidates. 
Upon his return to Washington, he called for a special committee of five 
seantors "To investigate certain matters making propaganda adverse to Huey P. 
Long. "4  He explained this request by charging that monied interests in the 
country were waging a campaign to defame him.   More specifically, he said that 
the immediate reason for the vendetta lay in his recent efforts to establish a 
hbid., p. 60.      2Ibid., pp. 217-219. 
*T. Harry Williams, Huey Long, pp. 669-675. 
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model tax law in Louisiana with proposals to take taxes off the little men and tax 
instead the oil companies, the cotton and stock exchanges in New Orleans, and 
the high personal incomes.   Basically, however, he attributed the campaign to 
his advocacy of a redistribution of wealth, a philosophy which monied interests 
viewed as dangerous to the country.   Long pleaded eloquently before the senate 
that he had a right to urge resolutions limiting wealth "without this unleashing of 
the hounds, this hiring of publicity agents, this swarming of the land with a 
wealth of agents for four years,  this branding of my friends and my asso- 
ciates . . .  . 
Long's charges were probably not well grounded in fact although some 
correspondents asserted that the Morgan interests had hired a public relations 
firm to defame him.     Long's outburst may have partly been a manifestation of 
feelings of suspicion and persecution which developed during the preceding year. 
Despite success in placing himself and his program before the American people, 
Long had suffered a series of political setbacks in 1933 which seemed to have 
affected him emotionally.   In June 1933, President Roosevelt deprived him of 
patronage, and thus precipitated the break between the two men which came later 
that year.3   Roosevelt's reasons for taking this action are not completely clear. 
Long had opposed some of the administration's measures like the Economy Bill, 
1Ibid., pp. 1560-1563. 
2T. Harry Williams, Huey Long, pp. 640-641. 
3Ibid., p. 639. 
37 
but he had not greatly obstructed the New Deal program.   Furthermore, it is 
doubtful that Roosevelt saw Long in 1933 as a dangerous demagogue or a grave 
threat to democracy.1   The explanation for the break lies perhaps in the dif- 
ference in philosophy already referred to and the political ambitions of both 
men.   This highlighted the possibility that a contest between Long and Roosevelt 
would eventually occur, and the president wanted to weaken Long's base of 
power in Louisiana.   In any event, the president's action amounted to a degree of 
political humiliation for Long. 
Other incidents in 1933 also affected Long adversely.   In August, he 
attended a charity show at the Sands Point Bath and Country Club in Long Island, 
New York, and apparently as a result of some mischievous behavior in the men's 
room received a black eye from the hand of an unknown assailant.   He received a 
great deal of ridicule and unfavorable publicity from this although it is ques- 
tionable whether or not it damaged him politically.     More serious, however, 
were incidents concerning Louisiana politics.   Edwin Broussard, the anti-Long 
senator who had been defeated by John Overton in the 1932 primary, charged the 
Long organization with fraud, and in the early part of 1933 a senate subcom- 
mittee conducted an investigation of the election.3  While Overton was clearly 
the winner, the investigation eventually revealed that Long's machine, like pre- 
vious political groups in Louisiana, had fraudulently procured the choice of 
1Ibid., p. 640.     2Ibid., P- 653. 
2Ibid.,  pp. 604-618. 
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election commissioners favorable to itself.   These officials in turn were able to 
manipulate the vote in certain localities.   The investigation also revealed that 
the Long machine induced state employees to make political contributions.   The 
machine had not stolen the election, but its tactics were not those advocated in 
civics books.   Also, the Louisiana Honest Election League suspected fraud in 
the November 1932 general election.   Two state constitutional amendments, one 
of which authorized New Orleans to purchase a ferry had passed with more votes 
than the forces of Long and Walmsley (who were allied at this time) were ex- 
pected to deliver.   The League after much agitation succeeded in getting a 
recount in September 1933.   It revealed significant discrepancies in the original 
count, but did not nullify the passage of the amendments.    Long explained the 
discrepancies as the result of hasty counting,  but his enemies could proclaim 
that the Long machine was guilty of fraud.   Further,  Long tried to block the 
investigation of the election, and at one point had Governor Allen proclaim 
"partial martial law" in New Orleans.   Therefore, his enemies could also 
charge him with attempting to intimidate those trying to conduct the investi- 
gation. l 
Such incidents as these gave aid and comfort to Long's enemies in 
Louisiana, and somewhat diminished his prestige and popularity.   He en- 
countered hostile crowds during his October tour of the state in behalf of tax 
reforms, even in areas known to be Long strongholds. 
This reversal of fortune affected Long psychologically, according to 
llKi 
2,L. Ibid.,  pp. 654-660.        Ibid., pp. 662-665 
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T. Harry Williams.   It helped plunge him into abnormal depression and made 
him fearful, suspicious, and vindictive.   His efforts to block the investigation 
of the constitutional vote was an over-reaction to the true threat which an in- 
vestigation would pose.   "It was the response of a politician who was off balance 
a nd not acting with his normal perception. "1 
While Long's charges of a Wall Street vendetta against him appear to be 
exaggerated and perhaps expressive of feelings of persecution, they do not in 
themselves indicate that Long was suffering from a severely disturbed mental 
condition.   His subsequent action shows that he was thinking clearly, at least 
from the standpoint of his political interests.   He chose this low point in his 
career to launch his Share-Our-Wealth campaign, a movement which could 
possibly force his program upon the major political parties, or alternatively 
carry Long himself to the presidency. 
The Share-Our-Wealth movement began on February 5,  1934, when 
Long issued an appeal to the people of America to organize Share-Our-Wealth 
societies in every community.   The societies were to support such proposals as 
a minimum "homestead" worth $5,000 for each family, and old-age pensions of 
$30 per month for persons over sixty years of age who earned less than $1,000 
per year or who possessed less than $10,000 in cash or property.   Other 
proposals included the limitation of working hours to prevent overproduction and 
create jobs, the limitation of agricultural production to the amounts which could 
ITK; Ibid., p. 660. 
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be sold and consumed, better care for veterans, and higher taxation to provide 
public works for the unemployed. * 
A brief glance at these proposals reveals that they were entirely con- 
sistent with what Long had previously advocated.   The guaranteed $5, 000 
minimum wealth per family, while a new proposal, certainly could be viewed as 
a better guarantee for the redistribution of wealth.   Long arrived at the $5, 000 
figure by calculating the wealth of the United States at 400 billion dollars, or 
about $15, 000 per family, one-third of which he felt would be a fair limit for 
the government to guarantee as a minimum level of wealth. 
Long included in his Share-Our-Wealth program the proposal for old- 
age pensions which he had placed before Congress.   However, the specific 
maximum limits on fortunes, incomes, and inheritances which he urged upon 
Congress were strikingly absent from the Share-Our-Wealth proposals.   This 
would leave him room to lower the maximum levels permitted as expensive new 
proposals such as guaranteed $5, 000 homesteads and old-age pensions were 
added to his plans. 
Long also fought for measures which he felt would help balance produc- 
tion and consumption in both agriculture and industry.   He had, for example, 
supported a bill offered by Senator Hugo Black of Alabama to establish a thirty - 
hour work week for major industries.   Long claimed that this bill would help 
Congressional Record,  73rd Congress, 2nd Session,  LXXVIII, p. 1920. 
2Ibid., p. 1921. 
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balance production with consemption, help end unemployment, and thereby help 
the laboring man to bargain for his wages without having to accept whatever 
pittance he could get because of the competition of thirteen million unemployed. 
Long continued to express his preference for the Black bill, even after it had 
become sidetracked by the NRA proposal which the administration preferred. 
Long was prepared to go even further than the Black bill in reducing the work 
week if it was required to balance production with consumption.   He indicated 
that he would not be adverse to a fifteen-hour week, explaining that it would 
2 
provide more time for leisure, education and the like. 
Long's plan to balance agricultural production with consumption had 
also been advocated prior to launching the Share-Our-Wealth program.   In the 
early part of 1932 he suggested that all cotton growing states completely pro- 
hibit cotton production for one year in order to raise the market price.   He also 
advocated a federal plan to balance all agricultural production with consumption 
through government production control and storage of surplus crops, and a one 
year's ban on the planting of any crop whenever the surplus amounted to one 
year's supply.   To provide temporary employment for farmers until the surplus 
had been reduced and they could return to farming, Long proposed a giant 
program of public works.3   His position on the farm problem was not, therefore, 
Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, 1st Session,  LXXVI1,  p. 1247. 
2congressionalRecord, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session,  LXXVIII, p. 1921. 
3Ibid. 
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entirely in accord with that of the administration.   However, Long voted for the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, even though he subsequently expressed 
much opposition to the destruction of existing farm produce while people were in 
need of food and clothing. 
Long's intention "to care for the veterans of our wars, " was also con- 
sistent with his previous action in the senate.   As indicated earlier, Long had 
voted against the Economy Act which sought to reduce veterans' compensation. 
He subsequently supported all attempts to restore the cuts to the veterans, and 
further still, he joined others in demanding the immediate payment of the 
soldiers' bonus.   The bonus had been granted by Congress in 1924 in the form of 
a twenty-year endowment insurance policy, payable to the veteran in 1945.   How- 
ever, the depression stimulated demands for its immediate payment.   Long 
supported all legislative efforts toward that end and initiated legislation himself 
to pay the bonus.   He ended the first session of the 73rd Congress protesting the 
economic plight of the veterans. 
At least one issue for which Long had fought, currency inflation, was 
not included in the Share-Our-Wealth program.   For the purpose of inflation, 
Long offered,  in January 1933, an amendment to the Glass Banking bill authoriz- 
ing the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase specific amounts of silver bullion 
and issue silver certificates in denominations of up to $100.   Senator Wheeler of 
Montana,  with Long's approval, then offered a substitute permitting unlimited 
Congressional Record,  73rd Congress,  1st Session,  LXXVU, p. 6130. 
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1 coinage of gold and silver at the ratio of 16 to 1.     Both amendments were tabled 
on January 24, but in later congresses Long supported all inflationary moves. 
The reason for Long's neglect in calling for inflation of the currency in his 
Share-Our-Wealth program was that he did not see inflation as a satisfactory 
means of redistributing wealth.   He spoke directly to that point a year later 
when, after expressing support for the Wheeler plan, he stated,  "Remonetizing 
silver does not, of itself, wholly accomplish a sharing of our wealth, but it will 
o 
facilitate legislation toward that end." 
With the Share-Our-Wealth plan, Long converted his original proposals 
to limit fortunes and redistribute wealth into a more compact and politically 
attractive program to offer to the people as an alternative to the New Deal.   He 
continued to add to it.   Within a year, he included proposals for free education of 
3 
all capable students through college or professional school   and a guaranteed 
annual income of not less than $2, 500 per family.     He also changed the proposal 
for old-age pensions from $30 per month to "an amount sufficient." 
This last revision was inspired perhaps by the popularity of Dr.  Francis 
Townsend's plan to provide pensions of $200 per month to the elderly.   The 
educational proposal, however, reflected Long's interest in education from the 
412. 
1Ibid.,  73nd Congress, 2nd Session, LXXV1, p. 2293. 
2The American Progress, February 1, 1934, p. 1, 3-4. 
Congressional Record,  74th Congress,  1st Session, LXXIX, pp. 410- 
4Ibid.,  pp. 3436-3439.      5Ibid., pp. 410-412. 
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time he was governor of Louisiana.   The guaranteed minimum income may have 
been inspired by recent reading.   Previous to this proposal, for example,  Long 
quoted the financial writer Roger Babson, who indicated that an annual income 
of $10, 000 per family was possible with intensive production and proper distri- 
bution.   Long then pointed out that an annual earning of $2,000 per family would 
be sufficient to let every family live in respectability after they had acquired the 
basic comforts of a home. 
Long's Share-Our-Wealth proposals must have had a great appeal for 
individuals plagued with the poverty and economic insecurity of the depression 
years.   To others,  however, the plan was unrealistic and impractical.   Who was 
right?  One might approach the question by examining whether the program was 
a possible cure for the depression, and whether it was compatible with American 
economic freedom. 
In considering Long's program as a cure for the depression, one is 
immediately struck by the economic effect of the lesser government spending 
which actually occurred, by comparison with Long's proposals.   By the summer 
of 1937, for example, largely as a result of New Deal spending, the economy had 
2 
in ade steady progress toward recovery/  The Index of Physical Volume of 
1Ibid., pp. 2832-2834. 
2William E. Leuchtenburg,  Franklin P. Roosevelt and the New Peal 
(New York:   Harper and Row, Publishers,  1963), p. 244. 
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Industrial Production had climbed to 113 from the 1932 low of 58.X   But when the 
president, worried about the dangers of inflation, cut WPA and PWA funds 
drastically and invoked a policy of credit contraction, the economy quickly sank 
2 
to the 1935 levels.     Again, after renewed New Deal spending, the economy 
turned upward again within a few months, and by 1939 the Physical Volume of 
Industrial Production had risen to 108.     Yet New Deal spending had not been 
extremely great.   The federal expenditure for 1933 and 1934 combined was only 
10.4 billion dollars, and prior to 1937, the highest expenditure for any one year 
was never more than 8.5 billion.     Long had advocated in 1933 a 10 billion dollar 
fund to be used for public works alone, and if one adds to this government ex- 
penditure for educational benefits, the veterans' bonus, old-age pensions,  the 
buying and storage of surplus farm commodities, and the guaranteeing of incomes 
and homesteads, it becomes clear that New Deal spending would have been 
dwarfed by comparison.   Long's program would certainly have injected into the 
economy a sum large enough to permit John Maynard Keynes' idea of "pump 
priming" a chance to operate better than it actually did under the New Deal. 
1Broadus Mitchell, Depression Decade (New York:   Rinehart and Com- 
pany,  1947), Chart:   "Physical Volume of Industrial Production,  1929 to 1941, " 
p. 446. 
2William E. Leuchtenburg,  Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 
pp. 243-244. 
3Broadus Mitchell, Depression Decade, p. 446. 
4Robert Lekachman, The Age of Keynes (New York:   Random House, 
1966), Chart:   "Receipts and Expenditures by the Federal Government,  1929 - 
1941," p. 115. 
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Then with the guaranteed annual income to assure continued mass purchasing 
power and to guard against another recession, it is quite possible that Long's 
program would have cured the depression. Did Long know this? He may not 
have been aware of Keynes' concept of "pump priming, " but it is likely, as 
Williams suggests, that he sensed the relationship of government spending to 
prosperity.l 
Was Long's plan practical then from an economic standpoint?  Time 
has proved that some parts of his plan were feasible because they have es- 
sentially been accepted and applied to an extent beyond what Long advocated. 
His proposal to care for the veteran, for example, did not seem to go much 
beyond promising to pay the bonus immediately and provide good medical and 
disability assistance.   The veterans* bonus has been paid, of course, and today's 
veterans receive medical care, disability payments, plus aid for education and 
other benefits.   In the field of education, the government has provided aid at all 
levels,  including loans and grants to needy or capable students, although it has 
not gone so far as the granting of free college education as Long proposed. 
Obviously, it was that part of Long's program which proposed to 
guarantee an annual salary of $2, 500 to each family and a $5,000 homestead 
which was and still is considered most unrealistic economically.   By certain 
standards, one can prove that Long's promise of a homestead and an income were 
not possible.   According to Carleton Beals, if all the private incomes above 
*T. Harry Williams, Huey Long, p. 305. 
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$1,000, 000 in the prosperous year 1929 had been equally divided among the 
families who received less than $2, 500,  it would have amounted to $35 per 
family.     Such figures are probably correct.   The economist Robert Heilbroner, 
while not discussing Long's proposals,  reported that an equal division of all the 
disposal income of the nation in 1929 would have resulted in an income of 
$2, 300 per household, just $300 above the $2,000 minimum which the Brookings 
Institute held was required for bare necessities.2   Obviously, one runs into a 
distressing impasse if he tries to provide Long's proposed salary by dividing the 
total income of 1929 or the income of any of the depression years.   One does 
Long's proposals an injustice by declaring them impractical on that basis, how- 
ever.   With the implementation of Long's program, especially the guaranteed 
salary, the economy would have been drastically different from the economy of 
1929 or the economy of succeeding years.   The initial government outlays and the 
continued security of a guaranteed annual income would have boosted spending 
and consumer demands tremendously, perhaps opening factories by the hundreds 
and jobs by the millions.   Most families who would have needed government 
subsidies to earn $2, 500 would have soon required no supplementary funds at all, 
and government spending could have decreased from its initial outlay without 
impairing the economic growth of the country. 
If one doubts this, he need only look at the economy since Long's time. 
^arleton Beals, The Story of Huey P. Long, pp. 311-312. 
2Robert L. Heilbroner, The Future as History (New York:   Harper and 
Row,  Publishers,  1959), pp. 120-121. 
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According to Heilbroner, about sixty percent of American families were below 
the $2, 000 subsistence income in 1929.   But in 1958, only thirty-six percent were 
below an income of $4, 000, the equivalent of the 1929 subsistence level.   Further, 
according to Heilbroner, much of the thirty-six percent below that level can be 
attributed to social rather than to economic malfunction, or racial injustice 
which kept the average level of nonwhite incomes fifty percent below that for 
whites.     Certainly a guaranteed income for each family could today be pro- 
vided, perhaps even within the present tax structure.   Why?  Because of the 
present economic growth which resulted not so much from the implementation of 
domestic programs as from huge military expenditures.   Long's total program 
would have expanded the economy at least to the point at which minimum incomes 
could have been guaranteed. 
But was the guaranteed $5,000 homestead practical?  This is the most 
difficult of Long's proposals to fulfill.   Beals claimed that providing a $5, 000 
homestead for each family in 1929 would have required the confiscation of all 
property in excess of $500, 000, a limit far below the maximum which Long pro- 
posed to allow.2   Again, his figures are probably correct, but he was still 
thinking in terms of the 1929 economy, not that which would have been created by 
Long's proposals.    With economic growth, the problem of finding revenue for a 
minimum homestead lessens somewhat, and in a greatly expanded economy it 
1Ibid., p. 123. 
2Carleton Beals, The Story of Huey P. Long, p. 311. 
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could conceivably have been done with only a heavy taxation of capital instead of 
a limitation of fortunes.   The greatest difficulty in this proposal, however,  is 
that with a large capital levy tax the government would be forced to take wealth 
in the form of property or securities as well as cash, and such wealth could not 
be easily distributed.    Long himself likely did not know how to handle this pro- 
blem.   He would probably have issued currency against such assets, as once in 
debate he indicated could be done.   While such a solution is weighted heavily 
with problems,  it could conceivably have permitted Long to furnish every family 
with an initial homestead allowance of $5, 000.   It is clearly not as unrealistic as 
it might seem at first. 
Granting that Long's program was economically practical, was it com- 
patible with American economic freedom?  A great objection might be that it 
would have increased government control of the economy, thereby diminishing 
individual freedom.   Obviously, government control and planning would have been 
necessary on a far greater scale than anything previously known with the possible 
exception of World War I.   If Long had issued currency against the assets of 
fortunes accruing to the government,  for example,   inflation would have occurred, 
and conceivably price controls and other artificial means of governing the 
economy would have been necessary.   Such measures were accepted during 
World War II and have been proposed occasionally since; few people today equate 
economic freedom with laissez-faire economics. 
Today, we have adopted much of the spirit of Long's program whether 
we realize it or not.   For example, the government has increasingly taken a 
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larger role in the economy in order to lessen poverty and provide such things as 
decent housing,  health facilities, and schools, and it is running into many of the 
same problems which Long would have faced in his plans.   The fact is that we 
are being forced toward the most radical parts of Long's program by our desire 
to eliminate poverty and provide decent housing.   We are more and more coming 
to see that a guaranteed annual salary may be necessary,  for example, and our 
struggle to provide decent housing has led to demands for government assistance 
in the remodeling of cities.   While no one calls for a limit on incomes and 
fortunes,  it is partly because the present tax structure provides it in some mea- 
sure.   In the post-New Deal welfare society of the past generation, moreover, 
incomes have become less concentrated; the share of the total income earned by 
the top one percent of the population has fallen from nineteen percent in 1929 to 
less than nine percent in 1958.     These things which have transpired since 
Long's time may have appeared radical to many in the 1930's as the Share-Our- 
Wealth plan did,  but today they do not seem incompatible with our ideas of 
economic freedom. 
Long's program was a basically sound plan to correct the worst abuses 
of capitalism by placing limits upon the maximum amount of wealth which could 
be acquired by any individual, keeping a balance of production and consumption, 
and guaranteeing everyone a share in the work and wealth of the land. 
XRobert L. Heilbroner, The Future as History, p. 124. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CAMPAIGN TO SHARE THE WEALTH 
After the introduction of the Share-Our-Wealth plan on February 5, 
1934, Long began an intensive campaign to sell it to the American people.   At 
the same time he continued his efforts in Congress to enact parts of it into law. 
On February 23, he delivered a coast-to-coast radio address.   Once 
more he blamed the depression solely on the concentration of wealth, and stated 
that nothing had been done to decentralize wealth although President Roosevelt 
and even ex-President Hoover had said that it was necessary.   He advocated his 
own program as a means of solving this basic economic problem.   In fact, he 
indicated,  fortunes might have to be limited to ten or fifteen million dollars. 
Long also defended his Share-Our-Wealth scheme in a New York debate with 
the socialist leader Norman Thomas.   The senator upheld capitalism, asserting 
that the difficulty was not with the system itself, but with the concentration of 
wealth in the hands of a few.   He claimed that socialism would destroy the profit 
motive, whereas his program would "leave enough profit to stimulate effort and 
inspire genius" and at the same time "put a curb on (capital] Greed. „2 
Long's efforts began to produce results.   The American Progress, 
Congressional Record,  73rd Congress, 2nd Session,  LXXVIII, 
pp. 3450-3453. 
2New York Times, March 3,  1934,  p. 7, 3-4. 
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which also participated in the drive,  reported that 150, 000 people were joining 
Share-Our-Wealth clubs each month.   Such rapid growth,  it said, could force the 
present session of Congress to pass legislation to redistribute the wealth.     By 
the end of March, the paper claimed that 2,128 Share-Our-Wealth societies had 
2 
been organized with a quarter of a million members. 
Long had no success in gaining senate approval for his program, how- 
ever.   On February 22, he supported an amendment to an appropriation bill 
which would have restored to veterans the same benefits they enjoyed before the 
passage of the Economy Act.   When this measure was defeated he offered an 
amendment to permit payment of the soldiers' bonus upon the application of the 
veteran.   He argued that his amendment would involve no new obligation as the 
government had to pay the bonus anyway in 1945, and it would benefit the entire 
country by placing money in circulation.   The administration still opposed bonus 
legislation, however, as being too expensive and Long's amendment failed by a 
vote of 64 to 24.3  He now asked that his proposals for old-age pensions and a 
limit on fortunes be made the unfinished business of the senate following the 
disposition of the issue then under consideration, the St. Lawrence Seaway 
Treaty.   Long was again frustrated in his efforts,    and he made no further 
1The American Progress, March 15,  1934,  p. 7,  7-8. 
2Ibid., March 29,  1934, p. 1. 
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attempt in this session to enact his proposals into law.   He did, however, support 
measures of other progressive senators. 
A revenue bill proposing to increase income and estate taxes came be- 
fore the senate in April,  1934.   It proposed that surtax rates be increased to 
fifty-nine percent of incomes over $1, 000, 000, and estate taxes to fifty percent 
of incomes over $10, 000, 000.     Senator LaFollette of Wisconsin and others then 
attempted with various amendments to raise the rates over those proposed in the 
bill.   Senator LaFollette's amendments proposed the highest rates with seventy- 
one percent of incomes over $1, 000, 000, and estate taxes of sixty percent of 
estates over $10, 000, 000.2   Long supported these efforts to raise the rates, but 
asserted that they fell far short of what needed to be done.   He also criticized 
3 
the administration again for its failure to decentralize wealth.     However, he 
did not himself attempt to amend the revenue bill to make it conform to his pro- 
posals on incomes and inheritances. 
This failure may have arisen from his involvement at this time in a 
bitter fight over the confirmation of Daniel Moore, an anti-Long man, as a 
collector of internal revenue in Louisiana.   Moore's appointment led to a dispute 
between Long and Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi which at one point held up 
discussion on the tax bill and became so bitter that parts of it were later stricken 
1Ibid., pp. 5971-5973.      2Ibid., pp. 5971-5973, 6410. 
3Ibid., pp. 5985-5987. 
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from the Congressional Record. *   Also,  Long may have feared that a vote on his 
proposals at this time would result in less support than they had received in 
1933.   Long's use of the filibuster, his increased denunciation of the administra- 
tion, and his overbearing personal behavior had alienated a growing number of 
senators, who might welcome a chance to vote against his measures as an ex- 
pression of personal animosity toward him.   Nevertheless, he continued to fight 
for inflation and the veterans' bonus, and in addition he was instrumental in 
getting senate approval for the Frazier-Lemke Federal Farm Bankruptcy Act, 
a bill which provided relief for farmers through a revision of the bankruptcy 
laws. 
Long's denunciation of the administration became increasingly pro- 
nounced during the early part of 1934.   Long apparently became convinced late 
in 1933 that Roosevelt had lied to him about his intention to redistribute wealth, 
2 
and Long distrusted the president afterward.     Also,  by June 1934,  it must have 
been clear to Long that he could get none of his Share-Our-Wealth plan through 
Congress.   This knowledge plus his own consuming ambition started him on his 
drive for the presidency and led to a tremendous struggle with the Roosevelt 
administration. 
The second session of the 73rd Congress ended on June 18,  1934.   In 
the recess which followed,  Long strengthened his position in Louisiana, partly 
XNew York Times,   April 6,   1934,   p. 1,   1,   and April 7,   1934, 
p. 4,  1. 
T. Harry Williams, Huey Long, p. 639. 
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in preparation for an all-out struggle with the administration.   He enhanced his 
popular support in the state with the passage of a law which provided a two-year 
moratorium on debts, and he extended his power with laws which gave him more 
authority to regulate utilities in the state and more influence in determining per- 
sonnel in public schools and municipal governments.     Long had actually acquired 
too much power in Louisiana by 1934, and he continued to strengthen his position 
as time went by.   He clearly established a secure political base from which to 
launch a drive against the administration.   All this was alarming to some in the 
administration.   Roosevelt himself saw Long not only as a potential rival in the 
1936 election, but as a potential fascist.     The administration would have to 
move against him with more force. 
The passage of the debt moratorium law in Louisiana gave the adminis- 
tration a chance to express disapproval of Long's activities there.   The Public 
Works Administration temporarily withheld certain funds until it was made clear 
that the moratorium law did not jeopardize municipal bonds which had been bought 
by the federal agency.   The Internal Revenue Service conducted an income tax 
investigation of top men in the Long machine with the obvious hope of indicting 
Long himself for income tax evasion.      Long in turn escalated his own war with 
the administration. 
In January,  1935, the American Progress carried an editorial entitled, 
"The Forgotten Man."   It accused the administration of having initiated a new 
1Ibid., pp. 737-762.      2Ibid., p. 795. 
3Ibid., pp. 793-798. 
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deal for corporations only, and cited as proof Secretary of Commerce Daniel 
Roper's statement that the best indicator of recovery was corporate earnings: 
We thought the New Deal was supposed to help the forgotten man.   When 
we saw it failing to do this, we laid the failure to a single mistake in 
judgement.   We still thought the New Deal was trying to help the man 
out of work, the busted farmer, the hungry children. 
But here comes the Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Dan Roper, 
saying things that make us wonder.   He makes us wonder if we've been 
wrong all the time.   He makes us wonder if maybe the New Deal has 
been aimed to be a new deal for the corporations. 
The same issue of the American Progress proclaimed that the number 
of people enrolled in Share-Our-Wealth societies had grown to twelve million. 
Whether it was really this large or not, the support for Long's program was 
undoubtedly very extensive by the time Congress reconvened on January 3,  1935. 
Immediately upon his return to the senate,  Long inserted into the 
Congressional Record information alleging that wealth was continuing to con- 
centrate in the hands of a few, and he denounced the administration for its 
failure to prevent this.   He criticized it further for its relentless income tax 
investigation of members of the Long machine and for its attempt to use WPA 
funds and other patronage against him in Louisiana.   He spoke of the recent 
legislation there and praised those laws which had helped relieve the little man 
of certain taxes.   He seemed especially proud of the debt moratorium law.   He 
stated that he expected the plan to become a national law and he indicated that 
The American Progress, January 4,   1935, p. 4,  1-2. 
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he might propose a similar plan to the Congress. 
Long also returned, in a national radio address, to the topic of redis - 
tributing wealth.   He claimed that unemployment had risen by an additional one 
million men, that five million more were on relief, and that the rich were getting 
richer while the poor were becoming poorer.   He accused President Roosevelt of 
adamantly refusing to tax the rich, and he lamented the fact that the national 
debt had risen to $28, 500, 000, 000 without anything to show for it.   He indicated 
that he had completely lost faith in the president, and he called upon the Ameri- 
can people to join him in the Share-Our-Wealth movement and work for laws to 
2 
redistribute the wealth. 
In February Long launched a major offensive in his war with the ad- 
ministration by demanding a senate investigation of Postmaster General James A. 
Farley.   He accused Farley of various forms of misconduct in office,  particu- 
larly the diverting of government contracts to favored companies.   This attack 
may have been partly a response to the administration's continued investigation 
of Long men which had resulted in an indictment of Seymour Weiss, a top Long 
lieutenant,  for income tax evasion.   Nevertheless, a successful attempt to 
prove that corruption existed high in the Roosevelt organization would have 
greatly aided Long in his political struggle with the administration. 
Long's political strength continued to grow in the early part of 1935. 
159. 
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The administration soon discovered by a secret poll that Long, as a third party 
candidate in 1936,  might receive from three to six million votes,  enough possibly 
to throw the election to the Republicans.     This growing strength and the attack 
on Farley prompted the administration to seek some way to defeat Long in his 
1936 Louisiana senatorial campaign.2  But Long, too, was busy plotting the 
defeat of administration leaders and others who opposed his program.   He had 
previously moved the date of the Louisiana primary from September to January, 
1936, apparently for the purpose of providing time to get re-elected himself as 
well as to campaign against both Senator Robinson of Arkansas and Robinson's 
associate, Senator Rat Harrison of Mississippi.   The New York Times quoted 
Long as stating,  "I'm going to beat Bat and Joe."3  It later reported that Long had 
also declared his intention of campaigning against another foe, Senator J. W. 
Bailey of North Carolina. 
On March 4, in what appeared to be part of the administration's 
strategy,  Hugh S. Johnson, the former NRA chief, attacked Long and other 
alleged extremists, charging that they were insincere pied pipers attempting to 
attract a following with the bait of sweet but unrealistic programs.   Johnson's 
attack seemed tantamount to a public announcement that the administration 
*T. Harry Williams, Huey Long, p. 845. 
2New York Times,  February 26,  1935, p. 12, 1. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid.,  March 24,   1935, p. 32, 8. 
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considered Long to be a serious political rival, and a great deal of publicity en- 
used from it.   Consequently, when Long answered in a radio speech on March 7, 
he had perhaps the largest listening audience in his entire career.   Long wasted 
little time with Johnson personally.   Instead, he took the opportunity to attack the 
administration and to propagandize his Share-Our-Wealth program.   He blamed 
the continuing depression on the policies of President Roosevelt, asserting that 
the blame could be placed nowhere else since the president had been permitted to 
do whatever he advocated. 
A few days after this speech, Long attempted to translate the educa- 
tional plank of his program into legislation. In a senate speech on March 12, 
Long declared that it was better to spend relief money to educate the youth of the 
land in universities and colleges than to spend it for "sweeping leaves from one 
2 
side of the street to the other."     He had argued previously that his plan for 
educating the youth of the land would help the nation's economy by taking student 
labor off the market,  increasing the demand for more teachers, and since physi- 
cal facilities would have to be expanded, increasing the number of jobs for 
architects,  engineers,  and men of related skills.     He now proposed an amend- 
ment to a work relief bill to provide one billion dollars to colleges and univer- 
sities to be used to aid needy students.   His amendment was defeated, however, 
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by a vote of 75 to 5,    and another amendment asking for a lesser amount was 
defeated by the less decisive vote of 58 to 27. 
By the first of April, the Democrats in Congress were certain that Long 
would lead a third party movement in the 1936 presidential election.     On April 
25, however,  in a not uncharacteristic move,  Long urged the Republicans to 
nominate Senator William E. Borah, a liberal Republican of Idaho,  for president, 
stating that he himself would back such a ticket. ^ 
In the meantime,  Long seemingly won a round with the administration 
in a struggle for control of federal funds in Louisiana.   He obtained from the 
legislature a state law placing control of all federal relief funds in the hands of a 
state board dominated by Long men. 
The cumulative effect of Long's growing strength was to help push 
Roosevelt to the left in the latter months of the congressional session.   The ad- 
ministration's Social Security bill and the president's tax message were two 
items which the administration undoubtedly hoped would undermine the programs 
of Long and other political adversaries.   While the program of Dr. Francis 
Townsend may have been the primary political target of the Social Security bill, 
the president's tax message seemed to be aimed almost wholly at undermining 
1Ibid., pp. 3443-3452.      2Ibid., pp. 3593-3594. 
3New York Times, April 9,  1935,  p. 11,  1. 
4Ibid., April 25, 1935, p. 2, 2-3. 
5Ibid.,  April 16,  1935, p. 12, 2. 
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Long's Share-Our-Wealth scheme. 
In the area of old-age benefits, the Social Security bill proposed to let 
many workers beginning in 1942, retire at age sixty-five and receive a pension 
of $10 to $85 per month.   For those already sixty-five and in need of assistance, 
the bill proposed a maximum of $15 per month from funds jointly contributed by 
the federal government and the states.   Long opposed requiring workers to con- 
tribute toward their own pensions, presumably because wealth would be distri- 
buted better if the government provided the entire amount.   He also opposed 
requiring states to match federal funds for aiding those already sixty-five.   He 
claimed that economic conditions made it impossible for some states to raise 
the amount which would be needed.   Using Mississippi as an example,  Long 
stated that if the requirement were met by that state, the poor man would have 
to be taxed far in excess of what he is taxed now. 
Long then proposed an amendment to the bill requiring the federal 
government to provide all the money for old-age pensions and to raise the funds 
by levying a graduated tax only on those whose wealth was in excess of one 
hundred times the average family fortune.     The amendment called for federal 
funds in the amount of $3, 600, 000,000 to provide pensions of $30 per month for 
persons sixty years of age or older whose income during the preceding year was 
less than $500 or whose property was valued at less than $3, 000.   The capital 
levy tax with which Long proposed to raise the money for the pensions reached a 
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maximum rate of ninety-nine percent of fortunes in excess of $8, 000,000. 
Long's amendment was rejected by voice vote in a defeat apparently so decisive 
that he refrained from asking for a roll call vote.     He supported the adminis- 
tration's bill, however, when it passed the senate on June 19 by a vote of 77 
to6.2 
Long's amendment concerning old-age pensions was his last effort to 
obtain senate approval for any major Share-Our-Wealth proposal.   His legisla- 
tive efforts in behalf of his plans testify to the seriousness of his desire to see 
his program become law, however.   It is true that Long never introduced a bill 
to guarantee an annual salary or to provide a homestead, but his failures with 
less expensive parts of the program would seem to excuse him for that.   There 
is little evidence that his legislative efforts were mere extensions of an insin- 
cere propaganda campaign.   Some of them were little publicized, like the 
proposals to strengthen the antitrust law and to amend the constitution permitting 
direct taxation of capital. 
Internal evidence in the unfolding of the Share-Our-Wealth proposals 
suggests that Long fully intended to carry out his program and was concerned 
to keep it workable.   Each new and expensive proposal for redistributing wealth 
was accompanied by a suggested reduction in the allowable maximum level of 
fortunes in order to provide the additional needed revenue.   He started out with 
a proposal to limit fortunes to $100, 000, 000, but by May 1935 he had reduced 
IT,.: Ibid., p. 9437.        Ibid.,  p. 8650. 
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the limit to approximately $5, 000, 000.     Meanwhile he added proposals for a 
guaranteed homestead, a guaranteed education, and a minimum salary.   One of 
his last proposed reductions of maximum wealth, in May 1935, was followed a 
week later with a proposal for a gigantic flood control program which had been 
worked out by the army to limit dust storms, droughts, deserts, and floods-- 
approximately a $10, 000, 000, 000 project.     It appears that Long clearly calcu- 
lated the cost of each new addition to his program and correspondingly reduced 
fortunes to finance it.    Forrest Davis provides evidence to support this view in 
his biography of Long.   He found through interviews with Long that the senator 
had called in experts to help figure out how to apply Share-Our-Wealth principles. 
As the experts considered Long's measures, a host of difficult problems ap- 
peared and called for extraordinary solutions.   To provide homesteads to slum 
dwellers of crowded cities,  for example,  new communities would have to be 
built and existing cities remodeled.   To bring work to the people of the new 
communities,  industries would then have to be decentralized and relocated. 
Nevertheless,  Long was not discouraged by the necessity of such gigantic pro- 
jects.   According to Davis, he seems to have accepted them as necessary steps 
3 
in achieving a redistribution of wealth. 
On June 19, the same day that the Social Security bill was passed, the 
president's tax message was read to the senate.   Unlike the Social Security bill 
l,u: Ibid.,  pp. 7048-7050.        Ibid., pp. 7586-7594. 
3Forrest Davis, Huey Long:   A Candid Biography, pp. 275-280. 
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which had weakened only one plank of Long's program, the president's tax mes- 
sage seemed capable of undermining the very basis of the Share-Our-Wealth 
movement.   The president stated,  "Our revenue laws have operated in many 
ways to the unfair advantage of the few, and they have done little to prevent an 
unjust concentration of wealth and economic power.       He then asked that the 
condition be corrected with higher taxes on inheritances, gifts,  incomes, and 
corporate earnings.   While the message did not contain a specific tax program, 
it contained so much of Long's philosophy that at the conclusion of the message 
2 
Long voiced his approval with the simple message,  "Amen."    He later told 
newsmen that if the message went through as stated, Roosevelt would take 
200, 000 Share-Our-Wealth clubs into the New Deal camp.   He indicated, how- 
ever, that he was sure the president's program would be emasculated either in 
3 
committee or on the floor of Congress. 
As the administration undoubtedly hoped, the president's message did 
take some of the momentum out of the Share-Our-Wealth movement—a fact that 
newspapers were quick to proclaim.   However, it did so by adopting the spirit 
of Long's program, not his specific proposals.   It seemed unlikely that the ad- 
ministration would support a tax increase to the extent which Long advocated. 
Long immediately began to exploit this apparent contradiction of words and deeds 
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in an effort to regain the initiative which he had lost.   He sent a public letter to 
President Roosevelt calling upon him to assist actively in passing a Share-Our- 
Wealth bill, and he posed certain questions which the president could not answer 
affirmatively without committing himself either to Long's Share-Our-Wealth 
plan or some other similar program.   Long subsequently pointed out that the 
message did not in itself constitute a tax program, and he called upon the ad- 
ministration to come forward with a specific bill. 
The tax bill which emanated from the president's message was,  as Long 
expected, much weaker than his own scheme.   In its final form it did raise tax 
rates, taking seventy-five percent of incomes in excess of $5, 000, 000,  for 
example, but in actual application, it would add only about $340, 000, 000 to the 
treasury.   By contrast, Long claimed that his plan would raise from 
$10, 000, 000, 000 to $15, 000, 000, 000 per year.   On July 19, in a speech entitled 
"The Need of Truth and Sincerity in Mr. Roosevelt's Promises, " Long denounced 
the president's bill as anything but a Share-Our-Wealth measure, and he as- 
serted that the ultimate hope of the country lay in his own movement. 
While Long's program may have been undermined somewhat by the 
president's move to the left,  Long himself was even more powerful in Louisiana 
than he had been at the beginning of the session in January.   He divided his time 
between Washington and Baton Rouge, where in a special legislative session he 
guided twenty-six bills through the senate finance committee in the record time 
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of twenty minutes.     Twenty-five of the bills were passed (Long having dropped 
one of them) and according to T. Harry Williams they completed the framework 
of his power structure.2   One law practically abolished the independence of local 
governments by placing under the state Civil Service Commission all parish and 
municipal employees and officials who were not popularly elected.   Other laws 
enabled him to control the hitherto anti-Long stronghold of New Orleans. 
Long's new power brought additional denunciation from those who were 
convinced that he was a dictator.   They argued that he failed to use his great 
power in Louisiana to provide such things as minimum wages and old-age pen- 
sions, and therefore he was hypocritical in claiming that he wanted to aid the 
poor.4    Long answered with the very weak argument that the people of his 
agricultural state would not accept much social welfare legislation, and he could 
not force it upon them.     He could have pointed out, however, that his Share- 
Our -Wealth plan was national in scope and that it required the resources and 
power of the national government.   It would have been illogical for a single 
state to attempt to limit incomes and fortunes, or guarantee every family an 
annual income. 
By August 1935, it seemed that Long and the president would inevitably 
have to deal with each other at the polls, and both seemed to be making preparation 
*T. Harry Williams,  Huey Long, pp. 850-851. 
2Ibid., p. 851.     3Ibid., pp. 851-852. 
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for it.   On August 5,  Long took note of several newspaper articles alleging that 
President Roosevelt would enter the 1936 congressional campaigns in behalf of 
Senators Robinson of Arkansas and Harrison of Mississippi.   Long, whose pri- 
mary election would come first, challenged the president to come to Louisiana 
and help the anti-Long forces there.   He derisively offered to appear on the 
same platform with the president and discuss,  "What has become of the pro- 
mises of the candidate of the Democratic party for the presidency. "*   He 
subsequently made many references to the coming Louisiana primary and the 
use of federal funds in that state to try to defeat him. 
On August 14, according to a New York Times report,  Long told 
colleagues that he intended to run for president in 1936 and defeat President 
Roosevelt even if it wrecked the Democratic party.   The article recognized 
Long's sincerity with regard to his program and possibly placed his objectives 
in proper order when it listed his aims as three-fold:   to beat Roosevelt, to put 
o 
over the Share-Our-Wealth program, and to become president. 
The expected contest never came.   On September 8,  1935,  Long was 
mortally wounded in an attempt on his life by Dr. Carl Weiss, a 29 year-old 
Baton Rouge physician, and on September 10 he died.   With no one capable of 
assuming the leadership of Long's national political movement, the struggle with 
the administration ceased, and the Share-Our-Wealth movement soon faded out. 
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Exactly how close Long could have come to winning the presidency can 
never be known.   Neither is it clear as to how much further his Share-Our- 
Wealth plan would have evolved.   The last complete resume of Long's plans for 
America was contained in the posthumously published book,  My First Days in the 
White House, which according to the New York Times,  Long finished writing 
about a week before his assassination.     The book was intended to portray his 
policies and accomplishments during his first days as president of the United 
States, the office which,  in the story, he was elected in 1936. 
The book is full of satire.    Long's desire for specialists in his cabinet 
led him to appoint Herbert Hoover as secretary of commerce and President 
Roosevelt as secretary of the navy.   Long cautioned reporters, a group who 
seldom supported him, to refrain from being yes-men, and he urged them to 
come to him whenever they felt there was incompetence or bad judgment in his 
administration.     He made John D. Rockefeller, Jr., the chairman of the 
National Share-Our-Wealth Committee, and when the multimillionaire ex- 
secretary of the treasury, Andrew Mellon, was later made vice-chairman of the 
o 
same committee, Long observed that "his face lighted with real pleasure."0 
Aside from this, the book obviously revealed something of Long's dream for 
America.   As president, he faithfully began to carry out his Share-Our-Wealth 
1Ibid.,  September 29,  1935, VI, p. 5, 2. 
2Huey P. Long, My First Days in the White House (Harrisburg:   The 
Telegraph Press,  1935), p.  18. 
3Ibid.,  p. 90. 
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promises by calling upon Congress to guarantee an annual income of $2, 500, a 
homestead of between $5, 000 and $6, 000, and to provide such things as free 
college education,  old-age pensions,  and the bonus for veterans.     He also 
began to carry out the gigantic engineering program to eliminate droughts, dust 
bowls, and floods which he had previously advocated.   In addition,  Long went 
beyond previous proposals by attacking a variety of social problems and launching 
a major national health program.   Apparently to pay for these additional items, 
Long proposed that incomes and fortunes be limited to one hundred times the 
national average.   This, according to his figures, would limit fortunes to 
$1, 700, 000 and incomes to $750, 000 per year.   But with other government 
services in mind,  perhaps,  he indicated that in the future fortunes might have to 
be limited to $1, 000, 000 or less.2 
Long's proposals were in many respects ahead of his time.   As indi- 
cated previously,  some of his program has been essentially adopted.   It is 
entirely conceivable that we may go further yet in adopting his program.   If 
the economy keeps expanding through continued military spending or other 
government outlays, those in need of income and housing, while becoming fewer 
in number, will not disappear.   Then with prosperity to make us generous, there 
will be humanitarian reasons at least to provide guaranteed incomes and decent 
housing for the benefit of those few.   On the other hand,  if we are permitted to 
cut back military expenditure and do not channel that money into other forms of 
government spending, a recession is likely to occur, and it is doubtful that 
1Ibid., pp. 108-112.        Ibid. 
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present Social Security benefits,  unemployment compensation, and welfare can do 
more than let the economy hold at a very low level.   Under those circumstances, 
government-sponsored projects such as guaranteed minimum incomes and 
continent-wide construction programs will be highly desirable and enticing as 
measures to boost the economy and keep it at a reasonable level of prosperity. 
Robert Heilbroner,  in The Limits of American Capitalism, points out 
that science and technology are the forces which will eventually erode capitalism 
and make government control and planning necessary.   As automation causes an 
increased displacement of labor,  he says, 
we can without much difficulty imagine a time when as small a   proportion 
of the labor force as now suffices to overprovide us with food [eight 
percent] will serve to turn out the manufactured staples, the houses, the 
transportation, the retail services, even the governmental supervision 
that will be required. * 
That inevitable day, perhaps a century hence, may be delayed somewhat by the 
repair and reconstruction of cities, the provision of education, public 
safety, and conveyances; in the improvement of health and recreation 
facilities; in the counseling of the voung and the care of the aged; in the 
beautification of the environment. 
But beyond that time, what of the unemployed?  Obviously, as Heilbroner indi- 
cated, government planning will be more pressing, and those displaced by 
technology will have to be given the right to share in society's output. 
Oddly enough,  Huey Long wanted to make a greater use of technology 
1Robert L. Heilbroner, The Limits of American Capitalism (New York: 
Harper and Row,  Publishers,   1965), p.  124. 
2Ibid.,  p. 123. 
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even if it meant that work would become incidental.   According to Forrest 
Davis, he planned to provide universities, libraries, and golf courses for the 
benefit of the people with leisure time.     Also, as seen in this study,  Long 
would handle unemployment created by technology by simply sharing the work if 
it meant only a fifteen hour work week.   This solution would probably work for 
some time,  but if the condition develops that Heilbroner foresaw, even that 
method cannot be relied upon to guarantee employment.   It may then be that 
homesteads, incomes,  education, and old-age pensions, all completely at 
government expense, but justified perhaps by the requirement of a minute 
amount of work,  will have to be provided outright and financed by extremely high 
taxes which approach the rates which Long advocated. 
As that time approaches,  it may be necessary that our piecemeal 
approach to problems of poverty will have to be exchanged for a comprehensive 
plan such as probably would have grown out of Long's approach in order to 
enable us to see all of our economic problems in perspective. 
1 Forrest Davis,  Huey Long:   A Candid Biography, p. 281. 
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